|
Symposium: "Affect and cognition in regulation of the mental and behavioral activity"
Chairs: Dorota Karwowska, Faculty of Psychology, University of Warsaw, Poland Kamil Imbir, College of Inter-Faculty Individual Studies in Mathematics and Natural Sciences, University of Warsaw, Poland
The aim of this seminar is to discuss the role of affect and cognition as well as to discuss their role in the regulation of human activity. Affect (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Jarymowicz 2001) may be a solid base of mental regulation and even behavioral activity. It is worth looking for the answer to the question: If humans are able to control their affective and cognitive processes. Lecturers try to get the answer from different researchers’ perspectives and backgrounds searching situations when people are able to control and those when they are unable.
1. Magdalena Stec (The Robert B. Zajonc Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland) & Wojciech Błaszczak (Faculty of Pedagogy and Psychology, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland)
The implicit Self-reference effect: the affective and cognitive base
A modified suboptimal affective priming paradigm (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) was used to provide an implicit measure the self–reference effect (“implicit self-reference effect”). Hexagrams described to subjects as “symbols of different human characteristics” served as judgment target stimuli. Subjects were asked to judge the extent to which the characteristic symbolized by each hexagram was self-relevant. In Study 1, photographs of faces expressing disgust or joy were used as suboptimal primes. As predicted, results showed a higher degree of reference to the self of hexagrams suboptimally primed with joy than with disgust. In Study 2 the suboptimal primes, were affectively expressionless photographs of female and male Caucasian (in-group) or Japanese (out-group) faces. The findings confirmed the predicted higher judged reference to self of hexagrams primed with in-group faces than those primed with out-group faces.
2. Yoram Bar-Tal (Faculty of Medicine, Tel Aviv University, Israel)
Cognitive structuring as a base of stereotyping
Stereotyping is very often viewed as a manifestation of cognitive structuring. Cognitive structuring (CS) can be defined as the creation and use of simplified generalizations of previous experiences for achieving certainty in minimum effort expenditure. One of the most important factors influencing CS is need for structure (NCS). NCS is presently defined as the extent of preference to use cognitive structuring as a means to achieve certainty. High NCS individuals, by virtue of using more CS, tend also to exhibit more stereotyping. However, Bar-Tal (1994, 2010) proposed that that the relationship between NCS and the use of CS is moderated by the perceived ability to achieve cognitive structure (AACS). AACS refers to the extent to which individuals believe that they are able to use information processing processes that are consistent with their level of NCS. Therefore, it is suggested that the effect of NCS on stereotyping is moderated by the person's AACS. To substantiate this hypothesis, two studies are presented. The first examined the effect of NCS and AACS on negative stereotypes held by Israelis towards Palestinians. The second examined the effect of NCS and AACS on perceived in-group (psychology students) and out-group (engineering students) variability. Results of both studies showed that for high-AACS participants, higher NCS was associated with greater stereotypical thinking, whereas for low-AACS participants, higher NCS was associated with less stereotyping.
3. Daniel Bar-Tal (School of Education, Tel Aviv University, Israel)
Cognitive - emotional barriers to conflict resolution
The talk will present a theoretical process model of socio-psychological barriers. It describes the selective, biased and distorted information processing that takes place as a result of an integrated operation of cognitive, emotional and motivational processes, combined with a pre-existing repertoire of worldviews supporting conflict beliefs, and emotions. These elements join together to obstruct any penetration of new and positive information or proposals into the individual and societal cognitive sphere. Thus, for example, peaceful gestures initiated by the adversary, new information about the humanness of the rival and his suffering, or even new information about one's own wrongdoing may not get proper attention and consideration. As a result, basic disagreements are preserved and reinforced together with the ideological and circumstantial societal beliefs that support continuation of the conflict. Empirical evidence supporting the model will be presented.
4. Dorota Karwowska (Faculty of Psychology, University of Warsaw, Poland) & Kamil Imbir (College of Inter-Faculty Individual Studies in Mathematics and Natural Sciences, University of Warsaw, Poland)
On the limits of the influence of orientation reflex and primary affect
The talk presents studies based on the assumption that the effectiveness of the inhibitory control (the basic determinant of antisaccade reactions) depends on the subject’s emotional state and personality traits, such as axiological complexity. The authors refer to emotions on the basis of the origins of them: the automatic emotions (due to the affective evaluation and primary affects). The authors assumed that automatic emotions as more diffusive, decrease effectiveness of the inhibitory control . The hypothesis predicted the performance level of the antisaccade task would be lower in the automatic-emotion eliciting condition than in the control condition. In two experimental studies, positive and negative (automatic) emotions were elicited. The results are coherent with the predictions, regardless of the valance of emotions.
|